We consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which …rm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown. A large …rm bene…ts from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, large …rms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rates. In contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy …rms, this model can generate a positive correlation between …rm size and wage without introducing any ex ante productivity di¤erences or imposing any non-concave production function assumption.
Introduction
The practice of job rotation is commonly observed in large …rms. In the literature, it is well known that a job rotation policy mainly results from learning of pair-wise match quality between workers and jobs. However, little work has been done to address the impact of job rotation within …rms on the labor market. One reason is that the study of job rotation requires a framework that case. Kaas and Kircher (2011) also study a directed search model with multi-vacancy …rms. However, none of these papers can generate a relationship between …rm size, wage and labor productivity that is in line with observations without introducing ex ante exogenously dispersed random productivity 1 . In our model, the presence of learning and job rotation creates an ex post heterogeneity among …rms and, therefore, generates a positive relation between wage and …rm size. Shi (2002) introduces a frictional product market to overcome this problem. In his paper, large …rms have more incentives to attract workers since they have a bigger share in the product market and are anxious to produce enough output. Tan (2012) allows for local convexity in the production function to generate a positive size-wage di¤erential. Yet, in our model, the production function is concave. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We …rst set up the model and characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium. Next, we derive the implications of our model and discuss the result and compare them to the empirical evidence.
The Model

Setup
There are N workers and M …rms on the market, both of which are ex ante identical. Denote = M=N as the ratio of …rms to workers. Note that does not represent the labor market tightness since the number of vacancies is endogenous in this model. Following the literature, we …rst consider the individual decision problem given N; M as …nite numbers, then we …x and take N; M to in…nity to approximate the equilibrium in a large labor market.
A match of a worker-job pair is good with probability 2 (0; 1] and bad with a complementary probability. If the match is good, we say the quality is 1, meaning that the worker-job match can produce 1 unit of revenue; otherwise, it is 0. The match quality is initially unknown and learned later. We assume the match quality is independent across jobs and workers, even within a multi-job …rm.
The game has four stages: o¤er posting stage (I), job searching stage (II), learning and rotation stage (III), and production stage (IV). At Stage I, the job posting stage, each …rm decides how many vacancies to post, k, and at what wage level, w, where w is potentially a function of k. For simplicity, we assume that they can create k 2 f1; 2g vacancies with cost C(k), thus the market tightness, de…ned as the ratio of vacancies to workers, is 2 [ ; 2 ]. Without loss of generality, we assume a convex cost function with C(1) = 0, C(2) = C, 0 < C < . We assume that wage, w 2 [0; 1], does not depend on any further information such as the realized number of applicants and revealed match quality in Stage III. We assume a …rm can commit to the veri…able wage it posts, and the …ring strategy, which may depend on the result of learning. 2 Consequently, …rms pay the …rst round of wages to all employees at Stage III and pay the second round only to the remaining ones at Stage IV. At Stage II, the job searching stage, each worker observes (k; w k ) of every …rm and applies for the …rms that o¤er the highest expected payo¤. We assume that workers can only apply to a …rm, instead of a speci…c position in that …rm. If the number of workers that apply for a particular …rm exceeds the number of vacancies posted, the …rm randomly hires just enough workers; otherwise the …rm hires all applicants. Then the …rm assigns job positions randomly to employees. Hence, a worker's expected payo¤ from applying to a …rm is determined jointly by both the posted wage and the probability of getting a job.
At Stage III, the learning and rotation stage, a …rm randomly assigns hired worker(s) to its position(s) and pays the …rst round of wage. If possible, the …rm learns match qualities of all jobworker pairs by switching workers to di¤erent working positions. 3 In particular, a …rm with k jobs and h employees, 1 h k, learns about the match qualities of all P k h = k!= (k h)! possible worker-job pairs, which have 2 P k h possible realizations, and assigns workers to job positions to deliver the highest revenue. A large …rm with k = 2 has the freedom to assign jobs to employee(s) to derive the highest revenue, which creates a potential bene…t margin compared to a small …rm (k = 1). For example, if a …rm posts 2 jobs, A and B, and hires 2 workers I and II, it can observe the match qualities of pairs {(I; A), (I; B), (II; A), (II; B)}, with the value of, say, f1; 0; 0; 1g. In this speci…c case, clearly the …rm shall let I do job A and II goes to B to earn 2 as the total revenue, provided that the …rm pays 2w 2 to workers. The job reallocation bene…t can be fully described as follows. From the point of view of an employee hired by a two-job …rm, his match quality state is s 2 fAB; A B; A B; ABg, where AB means his match quality is 1 with both job A and B, and A B means 0 with each, and both A B; AB can be interpreted in a similar way. When 2 The contract speci…es the wage at Stage III and Stage IV, conditional on workers being employed, and the …ring rule contingent on revealed match qualities of all employed workers in the same …rm. Without loss of generality, we focus on the contract space in which (1) the separation and job rotation rule is ex post incentive compatible, and (2) wage is time-invarying. Speci…cally, a …rm commits to …ring unquali…ed and/or redundant worker(s), and to paying all of its hired worker(s) the posted wage at Stage III, and paying all remaining worker(s) the same wage at Stage IV. Since workers and …rms are risk neutral, the optimal contract in this particular form is also optimal in a larger feasible contract set where …rms can pay time-varying wages, and need not …re unquali…ed and redundant workers with positive probability. 3 We assume that the rotating and learning process serves only to reveal the match qualities but does not generate any production.
two workers' states are AB; A B , the …rm can match between I and job B and II and job A. Hence, the probability of overcoming one or two mismatch can generate extra revenue for a large …rm. Tables 1 to 3 
At Stage IV, the production stage, a …rm is given the option of …ring its employee(s), and then production takes place depending on the match quality of each worker-job pair. A …rm with k jobs pays every remaining employee another w k . By separating the unproductive pairs and …ring associated workers, …rms can avoid paying extra wages.
Analysis
The solution concept we adopt is a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium (henceforth, equilibrium), in which each …rm chooses to be a large one with the same probability and posts the same contracts, and each worker applies to a large …rm with the same probability. We focus on this equilibrium selection because it delivers a limiting matching technology that has all of the properties required by the competitive model. However, as pointed out by Peters (2000) , the selection is interesting for its own sake. One implication of this restriction is that it forces mixed strategy continuation equilibria, since in Stage I (II), …rms (workers) cannot predict exactly where the other …rms (workers) are going in a mixed strategy equilibrium, which is compelling in the large markets considered here. The idea that …rms (workers) should not be able to predict the behavior of other …rms (workers) is much more convincing. The symmetric equilibria have the nice property that they can be interpreted as equilibria in which …rms (workers) choose the best replies to the average behavior of the other …rms (workers) in the market (and in which …rms (workers) guess this average correctly). In this sense they have the nice informational properties of anonymous equilibria in the sense that workers can compute their best replies from aggregate information about the market. We will solve the game backwards.
Stage IV: Production Stage. At the last stage, …rms …re workers when necessary. Speci…cally, the optimal …ring choice of a …rm is to …re a worker in one of the two following situations: (1) the worker is unquali…ed for any position in the …rm, or (2) two workers are quali…ed for the same position and only one worker is enough to deliver the highest payo¤, 1. In the latter case, the …rm will randomly …re one of the two workers. A small …rm will keep its only employee and pay the wage if the match quality is 1, and …re the employee otherwise, so the probability of separation is simply 1
. Alternatively, a large …rm with only one employee decides to keep her if she is good at either one or two jobs, and to …re her if her match quality turns out to be 0 on both jobs. In this case, the probability of a worker getting …red is (1 ) 2 . A large …rm with two employees keeps both of them and pays wages if the total revenue of 2 can be received, and …re the one(s) with 0 quality at both jobs. If the two workers are good at the same job and bad at the other, one will be randomly selected and …red. Combined, the overall probability for either one of the two workers losing her job is (1
Given any history of Stage II the job searching stage, which will be de…ned later, a …rm learns about match qualities of all possible worker-job pairs in Stage III, and then, if possible, it assigns jobs to workers to yield the highest revenue. Then we step back to Stage II and characterize the equilibrium in this subgame for any given history in which …rms play symmetric strategies. Then, we will characterize each …rm's o¤er posting strategy given the strategies of workers.
Stage III: Learning and Rotation Stage. A …rm with k jobs and h employees, 1 h k, learns about the match qualities of all possible worker-job pairs in this stage through the practice of job rotation, and pays the promised wage w to employees regardless of the learning results. In particular, for a small …rm with one job A and one employee, there are only two possibilities: the employee is either good at the job or not. This employee receives the promised wage w at this stage for sure, and she will receive the same w at the next stage if the match quality turns out to be 1, or she will be …red and receive nothing. For the worker, her expected payo¤ at the beginning of this stage is
where V 1 ( ; w) denotes the expected payo¤ to a worker in a small …rm with wage level w. De…ne F kh ( ) the expected total revenue to a …rm with k vacancies and h employees, so
A small …rm then takes away the rest, that is,
The only worker in a large …rm gets promised wage w in this stage, and she takes advantage of job rotation, and in the next stage, she gets …red only when she is bad at both positions with probability (1 ) 2 < 1 , so her expected payo¤ is
and the expected total revenue is also higher than that of a small …rm,
and the …rm takes away F 21 ( ) V 21 ( ; w). If a large …rm has two employees, then the expected total revenue is even higher,
Observe that F 22 ( ) < 2F 21 ( ), so the marginal labor productivity in a large …rm is decreasing in the number of employees. Now for the two workers, they will get …red for sure if they are bad at both jobs, or with equal probability if they are only good at the same job. The payo¤ to each worker is then
and the …rm gains an expected pro…t F 22 ( ) 2V 22 ( ; w) now that there are two workers. Given the ex post incentive compatible separation and job rotation rule, and since there is no strategic interaction at Stages III and IV, matched workers'and …rms'payo¤s are uniquely pinned down by the contracts they signed. Hence, an equilibrium in our four-stage game is consistent with an equilibrium in a reduced-form two-stage game that includes Stages I and II in the original game, and the payo¤ is speci…ed as follows: in a small …rm with wage w, the worker's payo¤ is V 1 ( ; w), and the …rm's is F 11 ( ) V 1 ( ; w); in a large …rm with wage w and one worker, the worker's payo¤ is V 21 ( ; w), and the …rm's is F 21 ( ) V 21 ( ; w); in a large …rm with wage w and two workers, both workers' payo¤s are equally given by V 22 ( ; w), and the …rm's payo¤ is F 22 ( ) 2V 22 ( ; w). In the rest of this paper, we directly solve equilibria of this reduced-form game as those of the whole game.
Stage II: Job Searching Stage. The realization of …rms' job posting at Stage I can be summarized by a history vector
) listing the number of vacancies and the wages of all M …rms. Let H be the set of all possible H's. In principle, a worker's strategy is de…ned as :
Given a history H, a worker chooses a vector such that (1) j is the probability that he applies to …rm j 2 f1; 2; ::M g and (2)
Consider the problem of worker i who is deciding whether and to which …rm to apply. Firm j posts k j positions and wage w j , for j 2 f1; 2; ::M g. If k j = 1, …rm j promises its prospective worker the expected payo¤ V 1 ( ; w j ) = (1 + F 11 ( )) w j ; if k j = 2, the expected payo¤ depends on how many workers …rm j eventually gets, and it is either V 21 ( ;
When the rest N 1 workers play identical strategies , this worker i chooses strategy^ to maximize her expected utility
where 1 ( j ) stands for the probability that this worker is hired if she applies to …rm j which posts k j = 1 positions, that is,
if she is the only applicant, she gets the job for sure; otherwise all applicants get the job with equal probability. The number of applicants at …rm j has a binomial distribution. Similarly, 21 ( j ) is the probability that this worker is the only applicant at the large …rm j and gets a job for sure,
and 21 ( j ) is the probability that this worker needs to work with someone else in the large …rm j,
A symmetric equilibrium at this stage is such that every worker chooses the same application probability vector , and moreover, a worker applies to …rms of the same size and wage with equal probabilities. Given any history H = (k
is a solution to (1) and
As mentioned before, we require symmetry across all workers'behavior to ensure an equilibrium that consists of only mixed strategies. In a large market, it is impossible for an individual worker to be fully informed about other workers'job application choices; therefore, modeling it by a mixed-strategy equilibrium is more plausible. More important, we assume that a worker applies to …rms with identical (k; w) to ensure the anonymity of …rms in that workers distinguish between …rms only by their sizes and posted wages instead of their names, j. This plays the role of search friction in our model. The symmetry is preserved when we take M and N to in…nity.
To model a large market, we will follow the literature and let M ! 1 and N ! 1 such that = M=N remains constant. De…ne (k; w) = lim M !1 P M j=1 1 f(k j ;w j )=(k;w)g =M . At the limit, a history is described by an o¤er distribution . De…ne the queue length at …rm j as q j = lim N !1 j N . Using (2), (3) and (4), it is straightforward to establish the hiring probabilities as functions of queue lengths at the limit. If …rm j posts one vacancy, then
otherwise, …rm j decides to become a large …rm and posts two job openings,
In a symmetric equilibrium, given (k; w), all workers play an identical strategy and receive the same and highest utility level denoted as U . Speci…cally, a worker applies to a small …rm j with positive probability only if
similarly, a worker applies to a large …rm j with positive probability only if
Here, U is referred to as the market utility level in the literature. Solving these two equations gives q j 's as functions of w j and U . Dropping , de…ne Q 1 (U; w j ) as the greater value between the unique q j as the solution to (5) and zero; de…ne Q 2 (U; w j ) by doing the same to (6) . Combined, we have Q k j (U; w j ), which determines the equilibrium queue length at …rm j with (k j ; w j ), when the market utility is U .
De…nition 1.
Given an o¤er distribution (k j ; w j ), a symmetric equilibrium of the Stage II game is characterized by (q j ; U ) such that 1. q j = Q k j (U; w j ) for all j, and
Hence, workers are indi¤erent between applying to any …rm j as long as q j > 0. At the same time, zero queue length implies that this …rm cannot provide the market utility level to workers. Stage I: O¤er Posting Stage. Now take one step back and consider a …rm's problem at the limit. Expecting the form of Q k (U; w) and U , …rm j's strategy is to choose a probability distribution j over f1; 2g R + , where j (k; w) is the probability that …rm j posts k vacancies and a wage w. If the …rm posts a single vacancy, it chooses w 1 to maximize the expected pro…t,
where 1 (q 1 ) = q 1 1 (q 1 ) = 1 e q 1 is the probability that a small …rm successfully hires a worker at in…nity, and F 11 ( ) V 1 ( ; w 1 ) is the expected pro…t to the …rm. The market utility level U is taken as given, and the …rm can attract applicants only if it can provide U level of expected utility to its potential worker(s). At the same time, the representative …rm solves the problem associated with a large one,
where 21 (q 2 ) = q 2 21 (q 2 ) = q 2 e q 2 is the probability that a large …rm gets only one applicant, and 22 (q 2 ) = (q 2 =2) 22 (q 2 ) = 1 e q 2 q 2 e q 2 is the probability it gets at least two applicants and therefore two employees. De…ne
Naturally, to get coexistence of both small and large …rms, it requires that = 1 = 2 , which is feasible in certain parameter subspaces.
De…nition 2.
A symmetric equilibrium of the Stage I game consists of a distribution (k; w), a market utility level U , and queue lengths q j , satisfying
is the equilibrium of the job application game.
Equilibrium Characterization. In the following proposition, we show that in the unique equilibrium, the only realized history contains identical small …rms and/or identical large ones: in a small …rm's contract, the proposed wage is w 1 , in a large …rm's contract, it is w 2 , and the associated equilibrium queue lengths in small and large …rms are q 1 and q 2 , respectively. Let be the equilibrium probability of becoming a small …rm. As a result, the proportion of small …rms is (1; w 1 ) = , and (2; w 2 ) = 1 for large ones. Since workers play a symmetric strategy, they will ignore …rms'identity if they proposed the same contract. Hence, we can use as the probability of applying to the group of small …rms, and 1 to the large …rms. Immediately, we have
where is the equilibrium probability that a …rm becomes a small …rm. Given the equilibrium queue lengths q 1 and q 2 , ( ; ) can be uniquely pinned down. Combining all of the four stages, we can characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
There exists a list of functions: c ( ) 2 (0; ), (C; ) > 0, and (C; ) > 0. Fix a set of parameters ( ; C; ) such that C 2 (c ( ) ; ) and 2 (C; ) ; (C; ) . There exists a unique equilibrium in which large …rms and small ones coexist. The equilibrium can be characterized by a list of functions ( ; w 1 ; w 2 ; ) such that: There exists a unique pair of (q 1 ; q 2 ), the queue lengths at a small …rm and at a large one, and ( ; ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) such that
and the wages in small and large …rm markets are given by
(1 + F 11 ( )) (1 e q 1 ) ;
If C; and/or lie outside the speci…ed region, which can be decomposed into three regions, there is no heterogeneity in realized …rm sizes. The intuition behind these three situations is simple. If C 2 (c ( ) ; ) and is either too small or too large, …rms are also the same size. When is too small, there are so few …rms in the market relative to workers such that it is easy to hire two workers and to take advantage of job rotation. In equilibrium, no …rm chooses to become a small one. Similarly, when is too large, there are so many …rms and vacancies that it is not only costly to post an extra vacancy, but also hard to …ll both of them in a large …rm. In equilibrium, no …rm wants to be a large one. The coexistence of small and large …rms is only possible when C is high enough compared to , and 2 (C; ) ; (C; ) . The region in which C c ( ) corresponds to the case of U = F 11 ( ), and the market utility is so high that a small …rm cannot earn a positive pro…t. As a result, in this region, all …rms are the same size. There are two possible cases here: either all …rms choose to randomize between being large and not entering by paying an unacceptable wage, or all …rms choose to randomize between being small and not entering. The outcome relies on the value of . Neither of these two possibilities is of interest. In the following subsection, we focus on the coexistence case and characterize the impact of job rotation on labor market variables.
Implications
In this subsection, we look at the implications of the unique symmetric equilibrium. The model simultaneously gives predictions on relationships between …rm size and productivity, separation rate, wage, which are roughly in line with empirical …ndings.
Size and Job Rotation Rate. In our model, the job rotation rate is trivially increasing in …rm size. We can generalize our model one step further and allow …rms to post 1; 2; ::; K vacancies. Now that a larger …rm can overcome the mismatch loss even more via reassignment of jobs, a higher rotation rate will appear. This is consistent with the empirical …nding of Papageorgiou (2011). We will see how this higher job rotation bene…t of larger …rms a¤ects the labor market.
Size and Labor Productivity. The average labor productivity of a small …rm is simply F 11 ( ) = , and that of a large …rm is a convex combination 22 F ( ; 2; 2)=2 + 21 F ( ; 2; 1), which is greater than since F ( ; 2; 2) > 2 and F ( ; 2; 1) > for any 2 (0; 1). As stated before, the marginal labor productivity of a large …rm is decreasing in size measured as the number of employees, F ( ; 2; 2) < 2F ( ; 2; 1), and therefore the production function of a large …rm is concave in labor.
Size and Separation Rate. In a recent empirical work, Papageorgiou (2011) analyzes the Survey of Income and Program Participation data, and …nds that workers in larger …rms are less likely to be separated from their …rms even conditional on workers'wages. In our paper, for tractability, we assume that after a …rm learns the quality of all possible matches between its workers and positions, it has the option to …re incapable employees and create separations. Due to the job rotation feature, large …rms have a lower overall separation rate than small …rms in our model. In particular, given the speci…c form of contract, as discussed in the previous section, workers in small …rms su¤er a separation rate at r Proposition 2. The separation rate in a large …rm is smaller than that in a small …rm.
Size and Wage Di¤erential. In standard directed search models with multi-vacancy …rms, it is well known that small …rms always post higher wage in the unique equilibrium 4 . However, this contradicts the observations on the labor market; 5 it is the large …rms that pay higher wages to workers. In our model, large …rms have the opportunity to reallocate workers over jobs and partially overcome the mismatch between workers and jobs. This job rotation feature creates two simultaneous forces that drive the size-wage di¤erential in di¤erent directions. The …rst e¤ect lies in the increased expected productivity of large …rms. When their expected productivity is higher, large …rms may be able and willing to pay higher wages to their workers, which makes their job o¤ers more attractive to workers. The second e¤ect is due to the reduced job separation rate in large …rms. Lower unemployment risk in large …rms works together with the …rst e¤ect to pull up the expected utility that large …rms promise to their applicants, that is,
However, the smaller separation rate can potentially push wages down. Taking both e¤ects into consideration, we claim that, when the mismatch risk is high compared to the extra cost of becoming a large …rm, large …rms can provide higher promised utility; and when the mismatch risk is even higher so that the …rst e¤ect dominates, large …rms pay higher wages. Furthermore, when and C are small enough, there exist a set of ( ; C) such that w 2 > w 1 .
We provide a numerical illustration of this result due to di¢ cult derivation of an analytical proof. In Figure 1 , we illustrate how w 1 =w 2 and V 1 =V 2 depend on C and . When = 1, we replicate the result of a standard directed search model with multi-vacancy …rms, simply because there is no risk of mismatch. In this case, large …rms o¤er lower wages for any positive C. When is small, it is possible to obtain the wage premium of large …rms. The intuition is as follows. Smaller implies a higher probability of mismatch and, consequently, a greater job rotation bene…t and a higher wage premium; thus the wage premium is decreasing in . There are four relevant regions. Region I corresponds to the case of C c ( ) ; which is not of interest. In region II, C is relatively high so becoming a large …rm is costly, and is large and the advantage of rotation is limited; thus, small …rms provide more promising o¤ers in the equilibrium, V 1 > V 2 . In region III, ( ; C) is moderate and the advantage of rotation raises large …rms'expected productivity so that their o¤er become more attractive than those of small …rms', and V 2 > V 1 . However, since workers in large …rms face smaller unemployment risk, when ( ; C) belongs to this region, to provide higher expected utility, large …rms do not need to pay high wages, so w 2 < w 1 . In region IV, ( ; C) is small enough, and the di¤erence in unemployment risk is limited, hence w 2 > w 1 .
For standard directed search models to generate a positive correlation between …rm size and wage, an exogenous productivity di¤erence is required. In particular, Kaas and Kircher (2011) and Lester (2010) assume that …rms randomly draw their productivity levels from a pre-determined distribution before they enter the labor market, and high productivity …rms decide to be large and low productivity …rms choose otherwise. If the ex ante distribution of productivity is dispersed enough, this technology di¤erence can overcome the frictional e¤ect of coordination failure and can generate a reasonable size-wage di¤erential. In their models, large …rm size and a wage premium are the consequence of high productivity. Our model suggests a somewhat reversed direction of such a relationship: even with ex ante homogeneity assumed, large …rms may emerge, taking advantage of the opportunity of job rotation, which in turn induces high productivity and a wage premium.
Size and Vacancy Yield. 6 Let k be the equilibrium vacancy yield of …rms posting k vacancies, which is the probability of …lling a position in these …rms. In our benchmark model, we have
, and ( 2 ) 2 = 22 (q 2 ). In other words, 2 = 22 (q 2 ) + 21 (q 2 ) =2. Our simulation implies that the equilibrium vacancy yield is greater in large …rms for any 2 (0; 1] and C 2 (c ( ) ; ). This is a typical result in directed search models, for example, Lester (2010) , because wages play an allocative role in the workers'application decision. However, in comparison to a model without the opportunity of job rotation, = 1, our model here predicts a greater disparity between the vacancy yields of …rms with one vacancy and those with multiple vacancies, i.e., the di¤erence between 2 and 1 is ampli…ed as becomes smaller. This is inconsistent with the empirical relation between vacancy yield and …rm size. We believe our implication on the relation between vacancy yield and …rm size is inconsistent with the empirical evidence because of an important factor argued by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010), a heterogeneity in job recruiting standard across …rms with di¤erent sizes, is missing in most directed search models including ours. In practice, …rms are heterogeneous in terms of size before they make wage posting and hiring decisions, workers also have both unobservable and observable heterogeneities, and therefore, this two-sided ex ante heterogeneity may induce heterogeneous hiring standards across …rms. Since our model is static and all vacancies and workers are assumed to be ex ante homogeneous, this preexisting heterogeneity cannot be captured. Introducing twosided heterogeneity into a directed search model is not tractable. To avoid this intractability and to capture the idea of a heterogenous job recruiting standard, in the extension section, we consider the possibility that large …rms have a di¤erent job recruiting standard from small …rms, and show that a negative relation between …rms size and vacancy yield can be generated.
Extensions and Discussions
Informative Interview. In our main model, we assume vacancies are ex ante homogeneous across …rms. Now we extend our main model to investigate the possibility that large …rms have a di¤erent job recruiting standard from small …rms. Suppose a large …rm, by paying an extra cost, can a¤ord a more sophisticated human resources department and, therefore, can draw an informative but noisy signal about the match quality between potential employees and their positions. We introduce a heterogeneity of interview technology among …rms of di¤erent sizes to capture the idea, proposed by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) , that large …rms have higher job recruiting standards than small …rms. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the following signal generating technology. If a worker is good at neither position, a bad signal is realized with probability 1 ; where 2 (0; 1) :
7 Hence, conditional on being matched with a large …rm, the probability that a worker passes the interview is
which is close to zero when ; ! 0. If a worker passes the interview, his posterior of being good at each position is given by
Similar analysis yields the equilibrium wages w 1 in small …rms and w 2 ( ) 8 in large ones, and vacancy yields in small and large …rms are given by
When is small (the signal is precise), large …rms are very selective, and therefore, the vacancy yield in large …rms can be smaller than that in small …rms. Figure 2 shows some numerical examples. For small and C, when is small, 2 < 1 , and w 1 < w 2 . Since a match is good with probability > in large …rms, both the productivity di¤erence and the separation rate di¤erence between large …rms and small …rms are ampli…ed. On the other hand, the interview e¤ect will decrease the possibility of job rotation. However, in our model, since the job rotation rate in small …rms is always zero, our prediction on the relation between job rotation rate and …rm size still holds. We assume that large …rms can only draw signal from matched workers. What if they could draw signals from all applicants? The result will not change qualitatively. The reason is as follows. In equilibrium, a large …rm faces …nitely many applicants. Even though there are more than 2 applicants, the probability that the …rm cannot hire enough workers is always positive if 2 (0; 1). When both and are small, the vacancy yield can be arbitrarily small. Hence, our prediction on the relation between vacancy yield and …rm size still holds.
Contract Forms. In our model, we assume …rms can only commit to a time-invarying wage. The time-invarying wage assumption is without loss of generality because (1) the goal of this exercise is to explain the cross-sectional empirical link between …rm sizes and wages, instead of comparing the dynamics of wages paid by …rms of various sizes, and (2) the optimal contract in this restricted domain is also an optimal contract in the contract space where wage can be time-varying.
Time Consuming Learning. In our model, …rms immediately learn workers'match quality in all positions. The only cost of learning is the …rst period wage paid by …rms. In practice, learning is time consuming, and the time for learning is increasing in the number of objects. As a result, it seems more reasonable to assume that a large …rm needs more time to learn its employees'match 8 The wages in large …rms, w 2 ( ) is obtained by replacing by in the expression of w 2 in Proposition 1. quality in both vacancies than a small …rm, which will weaken the advantage of job rotation in large …rms. However, when is small, the job rotation e¤ect is strong enough to overcome this heterogenous learning e¤ect. Consequently, our results still hold.
Conclusion
We modi…ed a standard directed search model to explain the size-wage di¤erential observed in the labor market, highlighting the e¤ect of the practice job rotation. However, in contrast to the standard directed search model with multi-vacancy …rms, our modi…ed model can generate a positive correlation between …rm size and wage without introducing any ex ante exogenous productivity heterogeneity or imposing any non-concave production function assumptions. We assume ex ante homogeneous …rms and workers and initially unknown match quality that determines labor productivity. Firm sizes are endogenously determined. By paying an extra cost, a large …rm bene…ts from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome the loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, large …rms have higher labor productivity and wages, and a lower separation rate. In future research, we would like to study the interaction between internal labor markets and external labor markets in a fully dynamic model.
Similarly, by (6), we have So the problem of (8) can also be re-written so that q 2 is the control variable, 2 = max
f 21 (q 2 ) F 21 ( ) + 22 (q 2 ) F 22 ( ) q 2 U Cg :
The …rst-order conditions to (10) and (11) are
U e q 2 F 21 ( ) + q 2 e q 2 (F 22 ( ) F 21 ( )) ;
where the equalities hold when q 1 ; q 2 > 0. We focus on the situation where both small and large …rms coexist, so we combine (12) and (13) at equalities and obtain the necessary condition for interior solutions (q 1 ; q 2 ) ; q 1 = q 2 ln 1 [F 21 ( ) + q 2 (F 22 ( ) F 21 ( ))] ; and q 1 > 0:
This also implies that q 2 > q 1 . Moreover, the necessary condition for coexistence requires = 1 = 2 , which implies 
These two equations give the unique solution (q 1 ; q 2 ) when it exists. Then (w 1 ; w 2 ) can be expressed as functions of (q 1 ; q 2 ) by using (5), (6) , (12) and (13) . Q.E.D.
